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Abstract 
Although merger and acquisitions (M&As) are acknowledged as an important means to access 
innovative assets and know-how, firms’ inventive output often declines in the post-M&A period. 
Financial, managerial and organizational constraints related to the M&A event contribute to 
inventive output declines and inventors’ departure. Prior literature treats the acquiring firm as a 
passive observer of invention declines. This study argues that acquiring firms can take measures 
by hiring new key inventors. We show that the hiring of new key inventors in the post-M&A 
period can counteract invention declines in two ways. First, these newly hired inventors are 
associated with an increase of corporate inventive output after the M&A. Second, they are also 
associated with an improved inventive output of inventors already working for the acquiring firm. 
These results suggest that an appropriate hiring policy can counteract declining inventive output 
of firms in the aftermath of M&As.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important means by which firms can access 
technological assets and know-how held by the acquisition target (Arora et al., 2001; Capron et 
al., 1998; Cassiman et al., 2005; Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990; Graebner, 2004). M&As grant 
access to technological competencies and capabilities (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999; Granstrand 
and Sjolander, 1990) and to essential intellectual property rights (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008; 
2014), therewith complementing or extending the technology portfolio of the acquiring firm 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cassiman et al., 2005; Cloodt et al., 2006).  
The expected benefits of M&As for innovation notwithstanding, most empirical studies report 
innovation output declines in the post-M&A years (Hitt et al., 1998; see Veugelers, 2006, for a 
survey) due to a shift of managerial attention from daily business activities and innovation to the 
M&A event (Hitt et al., 1990), M&A-induced financial constraints (Hitt et al., 1996) or 
organizational and cultural differences between target and acquiring firm (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006; Chatterjee, 1986; Hitt et al., 1991). M&As and their organizational 
implications constitute a disruption of firms’ routines which creates uncertainties regarding job 
security and task definitions and therewith induce demotivation and cognitive barriers to 
knowledge exploitation (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004; Minbaeva et al., 2003). Inventors react with 
departure or decreased innovative output (Ernst and Vitt, 2000; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Paruchuri 
et al., 2006).  
Prior studies on the effects of M&As on innovation output treat acquiring firms as passive 
observers that need to accept inventors’ departure and inventive output declines of incumbent 
inventors. We argue that acquiring firms can take measures to counteract inventive output 
declines, namely hiring new key inventors (Aggarwal and Hsu, 2012). Drawing from the 
knowledge-based view (KBV), we argue that the hiring of new key inventors has two effects on 
post-M&A inventive output. First, newly hired key inventors can constitute novel and superior 
sources of knowledge, strengthening the knowledge base of the acquiring firm. Acquiring firms 
can leverage the knowledge of newly hired key inventors and use it as an input on their own 
innovation process (Puranam and and Srikanth, 2007). Hence, the acquired knowledge of the 
newly hired key inventors is expected to have a direct positive effect on the inventive output of 
the acquiring firm after the M&A. Second, we derive from KBV and the theory of organizational 
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learning that there is an important indirect effect in the sense that the newly hired talents improve 
the output of incumbent inventors. The underlying mechanism is social interactions between new 
key and incumbent inventors which offer the opportunity of knowledge recombination (Nerkar 
and Paruchuri, 2005) and knowledge spillovers (Zucker and Darby, 1997). 
Our empirical results show that indeed the hiring of key inventors is associated with important 
direct and indirect effects on post-M&A inventive output. These results suggest that an 
appropriate human capital strategy around the M&A event can help avoiding a temporary 
decrease in inventive output in the post-M&A period. Our findings have important practical 
implications for executives being involved in an M&A, suggesting a proactive human resource 
strategy including the hiring of external key inventors. 
2. THEORY DEVELOPMENT & HYPOTHESES 
Knowledge creation within the corporate context 
The knowledge-based view of the firm (KBV) recognizes knowledge as the most important 
strategic resource for the firm (Grant, 1996), pointing out the essential role of knowledge for 
value creation and for achieving a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Felin and Hesterly, 
2007). Individuals are viewed as the sources of knowledge and talent, while the role of 
organizations is to facilitate knowledge exploitation (Cyert and March, 1983; Grant, 1996).  
Firms present a platform that enables individuals to interact and to exchange knowledge (Grant, 
1996; Tsoukas and Mylonopoulos, 2004). The process of knowledge exploitation is facilitated by 
the context the firm provides and its organizational routines within which knowledge workers 
carry out their tasks and develop their own routines (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Routines provide guidance for individuals within an organization and facilitate 
coordination (Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Winter, 1986) through formal and informal procedures and 
communication (Szulanski, 2000). Even though routines can be simple sequences, they are able 
to support complex patterns of interaction between individuals (Grant, 1996) and to store 
knowledge and information (Darr et al., 1995), making them key in the knowledge production 
process (Levitt and March, 1988).  
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The impact of M&As on invention output 
Prior studies have largely documented the negative impact of M&As on corporate innovation 
(e.g. Cassiman et al., 2005; Hitt et al., 1998; Prichett, 1985; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; see 
Veugelers, 2006, for a survey of the literature). These innovation declines can be traced back to 
several firm-level factors. First, managerial attention shifts away from daily activities and R&D 
to managing the M&A event (Hitt et al., 1990). Second, from a financial point of view, the 
pressure imposed by the acquisition investment (Hitt et al., 1991; Miller, 1990) and the 
introduction of cost-saving programs aimed at eliminating duplicative research efforts (Lengnick-
Hall, 1991; Veugelers, 2006) may induce cutbacks of R&D budgets. Finally, insufficiently 
planned and poorly executed post-M&A integration has shown to hamper inventors’ output 
significantly (e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Pritchett, 1985). The 
negative effects are stronger in the presence of cultural and organizational differences between 
acquirer and target as well as low technological proximity (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cartwright 
and Schoenberg, 2006; Cassiman et al., 2005; Cloodt et al., 2006; Ernst and Vitt, 2000; Junni et 
al., 2015) and less strong if the acquiring firm has a certain level of absorptive capacity 
(Hussinger, 2012). 
These firm-level factors affect the output of individual inventors by impeding inventors’ and 
organizational routines. The post-M&A integration process typically implies strategic 
reconfigurations and restructuring activities (Karim and Mitchell, 2000), higher fluctuation rates 
of personnel and changes in job definitions and positions (Ernst and Vitt, 2000; Walsh, 1988) that 
may create a sense of dislocation and even trauma for the individual inventor (Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1993; Paruchuri et al., 2006). Inventors within the acquiring firm become concerned 
about the future strategic direction of the firm and the implications for their tasks, their 
employment safety, and the future definition of their position within the firm (Souder and 
Chakrabarti, 1984). Psychological reactions generated by the disruptive nature of the M&A event 
limit the cognitive ability of inventors and their capability to process new information (Fugate et 
al., 2008). Inventors’ attention is focused on coping with the disruptive situation rather than 
processing work-related information (Fugate et al., 2008; Staw et al., 1981). On the one hand, this 
creates a cognitive barrier to the exploitation of the inventors’ knowledge (Jensen and Szulanski, 
2004; Minbaeva et al., 2003), which impedes the individuals’ ability to process new information 
and to exploit existing knowledge which is crucial for their invention output. On the other hand, 
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the accompanying task uncertainty and a probable job uncertainty can result in the departure of 
R&D employees (Ernst and Vitt, 2000; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Paruchuri et al., 2006). Thus, 
since firms’ output is composed of the contributions of the individual inventors, the combined 
effect of productivity declines of the individual inventors that remain within the firm and the 
departure of inventors negatively impact the firms’ overall inventive output in the post-M&A 
period.  
Hiring new key inventors as a remedy for post-M&A productivity declines 
While providing ample evidence on post-M&A innovation output declines and their causes (e.g. 
Ernst and Vitt, 2000; Hitt et al., 1991; 1996; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Paruchuri et al., 2006; 
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987), previous literature is silent about possible remedies that can be 
employed by the acquiring firm. We suggest the hiring of key inventors as one specific mean 
acquiring firms can take in order to counteract post-M&A inventive output declines. 
The mobility of inventors represents an effective transfer of knowledge across organizations as 
well as a channel for knowledge diffusion (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Hoisl, 2007; Song et al., 
2003). Inventors accumulate both tacit and explicit knowledge through their personal experience, 
by observing and working with their colleagues or through informal that they carry to their new 
employer interactions (Nonaka, 1994; Palomeras and Melero, 2010; Rosen, 1972). They also 
bring along key routines and relational capital that help recipient firms to change existing 
technological trajectories and to benefit from knowledge spillovers (Mawdsley and Somaya, 
2016; Song et al., 2003; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Tzabbar, 2009).  
Individual inventors, however, have been shown to be heterogeneous in terms of the knowledge 
they possess (Zucker and Darby, 1995; Zucker et al., 1998), with their output distribution being 
highly skewed (Lotka, 1926; Narin and Breitzman, 1995; Price, 1965). Within each technological 
domain and each organizational context, there are some key inventors that are crucial for the 
process of invention creation due to their superior technical knowledge and expertise (French and 
Raven, 1959), but also because of the tacit knowledge they carry (Hess and Rothaermel, 2011; 
Zucker et al., 2002).  
We argue that acquiring firms can hire new key inventors from outside the merged firm with 
superior past inventive output as compared to most incumbent inventors to proactively counteract 
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inventive output declines after M&As. Newly hired key inventors are expected to positively 
contribute to the process of organizational learning and knowledge creation within their new 
environment due to the knowledge they carry, their experience, skills endowment, and talent. The 
hiring of key inventors will provide the acquiring firms with access to these skills, competencies, 
and experiences (Rao and Drazin, 2002) and also to the knowledge gathered at their former 
employer (Barney, 1991). As an additional and new input to the firm’s knowledge production 
process, we anticipate the hiring of new key inventors to have a positive effect on the firm’s 
invention output.  
Hypothesis 1. Newly hired key inventors are positively associated with the acquiring firm’s post-
M&A inventive output (direct effect). 
Newly hired key inventors are also expected to have a positive impact on the inventive output of 
incumbent inventors at the acquiring firm, who are often found to experience an invention 
productivity decline after an M&A. KBV research of organizational learning has explored the 
mechanism of internal learning and transmission of information through members of an 
organization. Levitt and March (1988) explore different processes of knowledge diffusion and 
point out that transmission of information takes place through inter-personal contacts, somewhat 
similar to the spread of a disease. Thus, the movement of personnel, which facilitates the contact 
between incumbent inventors and newly hired inventors, is the main mechanism that facilitates 
the transmission of knowledge and organizational learning (Biggart, 1977).  
This transmission mechanism is documented in the prior empirical literature (e.g., Mas and 
Moretti, 2009; Paruchuri, 2010; Sacerdote, 2001).1  These studies argue that social interactions 
between inventors are an important channel to knowledge recombination (Nerkar and Paruchuri, 
2005) and knowledge spillovers (Zucker and Darby, 1997). Since a newly hired key inventor is 
likely to receive a key position within the acquiring firm she will be in contact with many other 
inventors within the firm (Kehoe and Tzabbar, 2015; Paruchuri, 2010). Accordingly, the newly 
hired key inventor has more channels for knowledge dissemination as compared to inventors in 
less central positions. Given their central network position within the firm (Bonacich, 1987; 
                                                 
1 Other studies that relate to the influence of key inventors on their colleagues are: (1) Azoulay et al.  (2010) who show that the productivity of 
peers decreases by 5%-8% if a key collaborator dies unexpectedly; (2) Oettl (2012) who finds that the negative effect refers in the first place to the 
quality of the scientists’ output; and (3) Waldinger (2012) who explores the long-lasting effects on the quality of recruits of key dismissals in Nazi 
Germany. 
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Krackhardt, 1990), we expect that newly hired key inventors can disseminate their knowledge 
within the organization both fast and effectively. 
The arrival of new key inventors can counteract the discouraging effect of the M&A event on the 
remaining inventors at the acquiring firm. First of all, the hiring of key inventors signals the 
importance of invention for the firm during the M&A period so that incumbent inventors’ 
uncertainty about their future is reduced. By hiring key inventors, acquiring firms show their 
commitment to invention which can reduce employees’ concerns about their future employment, 
allowing them to focus more on processing new, innovative information. Second, newly hired 
key inventors can spur the motivation of inventors at the acquiring firm because inventors have a 
strong preference to work with higher qualified colleagues (Barabâsi et al., 2002; Wagner and 
Leydesdorff, 2005). Third, new key inventors can leverage their position and resource access to 
reduce task and job insecurity among incumbent inventors as they provide new leadership and 
strategic direction to their peers (Kehoe and Tzabbar, 2015; Paruchuri, 2010). Key inventors are 
regarded as innovative leaders with the ability to initiate and lead innovation efforts (Kehoe and 
Tzabbar, 2015), so that by working with them, incumbent inventors engage in new projects that, 
given the expertise and productivity of key inventors, are more likely to be successful. Not at 
least, newly hired key inventors can strengthen the transactive system by closing the gaps that 
result from inventor departure with positive implications for the incumbent inventors’ invention 
output.  
As compared to periods of normal activity, when the hiring of key inventors might create 
resistance among incumbent colleagues or hamper their productivity (Huckman and Pisano, 
2006; Kehoe and Tzabbar, 2015), M&As represent periods of turbulence that involve structural 
adjustments, and changes in leadership, strategies and long-term orientation of the firm, as well 
as departure of key personnel (Ernst and Vitt, 2000; Jensen and Szulanski, 2004; Minbaeva et al., 
2003). Since new key inventors arrive at a time of turmoil, we believe that their positive effect, as 
a signal of R&D being taken serious within the merged firm along with the above presented 
arguments on knowledge transfer, outweighs potential resistance.  
Hypothesis 2. Newly hired key inventors are positively associated with the contribution of 
incumbent inventors to the acquiring firm’s post-M&A inventive output (indirect effect). 
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3. METHODS 
Dataset 
Our analysis is based on a large, tailor-made dataset set that draws from several different 
databases. It includes information on all publicly listed U.S. firms involved in M&As over the 
period 1980-2010 where at least one of the M&A parties is actively involved in invention 
activities in the sense that it has applied for at least one patent at the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) since its foundation. Information about the M&A deals was 
extracted from the database Thomson One Banker provided by Thomson Reuters. We consider 
only those deals that were completed and which involved majority ownership. The M&A data 
was linked to firms’ financial records which were retrieved from Compustat. The match between 
the two databases is based on firms’ name, state, and the firms’ identifiers CUSIP and PERMNO 
(taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database).   
Information on the patent activity of firms and inventors is taken from the NBER patent database 
and the Coleman Fung Institute for Engineering Leadership database (Li et al., 2014). Patent 
information is matched to the firm data using each firm’s identifiers and name. Data on the 
mobility of inventors is taken from the Coleman Fung Institute for Engineering Leadership 
database (Li et al., 2014).  
The resulting sample consists of a panel data set including 1,402 deals, corresponding to firms in 
62 different industries over a 31-year period. We keep a 9-year window around the M&A for our 
analysis of the M&A period (see Ahuja and Katila (2001), and Kapoor and Lim (2007) for 
similar choices). A 9-year window allows mapping the short time effects of the M&A. A too 
wide time window bears the risk to attribute output developments which are more distant in terms 
of time wrongly to the M&A event.  
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in our model is the firms’ inventive output as proxied by the number of 
granted patents per year of the acquiring firm (e.g. Griliches, 1990; Archibugi, 1992; Cohen and 
Levin, 1989; Griliches, 1990). We use granted patents and not patent applications because the 
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former is an indicator of successful invention (Ahuja and Katila, 2001).2 We count the granted 
patent in the application year. The advantage of the application year is that it is close to the actual 
invention and abstracts from delays that may occur in the patent granting process (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Ernst, 2001; Trajtenberg, 1990).  
After M&A indicator 
We use a dummy variable to distinguish the periods before and after the M&A. The variable is 
equal to zero for the years before the M&A and equal to one on the year in which the M&A 
occurs and thereafter.  
Incumbent Inventors 
We use the number of incumbent inventors as a proxy for the stock of knowledge which is the 
major ingredient to the patent production function (Pakes and Griliches, 1980). Our definition 
includes those inventors that are working at the M&A firm on year t. We assume that an inventor 
who patented in year t-X and again in year t+X for the focal firm is also employed at the firm in 
year t. Due to multicollinearity concerns, we normalize the number of inventors by firms’ size.  
Departing Inventors 
Mobility is defined based on the appearance of inventors on patent documents of different patent 
applicants. An inventor is defined to move from firm i to firm j when after filing the last patent 
application with firm i, she starts filing an application with firm j, and no longer with firm i. We 
measure departing inventors as the ratio of inventors departing the firm at time t over the total 
number of inventors at time t.  
New key inventors 
For testing our hypotheses, we generate a variable, new key inventors, that is interacted with the 
after M&A dummy variable for testing hypothesis 1 (direct effect), and with the after M&A 
variable and the incumbent inventor variable for testing hypothesis 2 (indirect effect).  
                                                 
2 Often patent citations are used as a means to account for the “quality” of patents. We restrain from using patent citations as an alternative 
dependent variable or as a quality adjustment for the patent count variable because the M&A could impact the citation likelihood and rate of the 
merged firms’ patents. For instance, a highly reputed target firm might impact acquirer’s citation rate after the M&A. 
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We define key inventors relative to the quality of the inventors already working at the acquiring 
firm, as measured by the total number of citations their patents received in the past. Following 
previous studies on post-M&A inventor output (see e.g. Kapoor and Lim, 2007, and Paruchuri et 
al., 2006), we apply a relative definition because we are interested in depicting a newly acquired 
superior knowledge source from the point of view of the acquiring firm.3 In order to account for 
the fact that knowledge gets outdated over time, we apply a depreciation rate of 15% per year to 
the inventors’ patents (Hall, 1990).  
Regarding our specific measure, we identify key inventors as those receiving more patent 
citations than the top 75% of inventors of the acquiring firm. We define key inventors who are 
new to the firm as the ratio of key inventors hired by the firm at time t over the total number of 
inventors at time t in order to avoid multicollinearity issues.  
Control variables 
We include total assets as a proxy for firm size (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Mansfield, 1986; 
Scherer, 1983). We take the logarithm to account for the skewness of its distribution. Further, we 
use a set of year dummies in order to control for time trends in corporate patenting. Industry 
dummies do not explicitly enter our specification because they are time-invariant and hence 
absorbed by the firm-specific fixed effects that we use. 
All independent and control variables are lagged by one year in order to limit endogeneity 
concerns.  
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Regression results 
We employ fixed-effects Poisson regressions with robust standard errors in order to account for 
the count data nature of the dependent variable and for unobserved firm-specific effects 
(Wooldridge, 2010).4 Table 1 presents the estimation results (see Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 
I for descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations).  
                                                 
3 In line with Aggarwal and Hsu (2012), we define newly hired key inventors relative to the majority of inventors that are already working for the 
firm. Key inventors in their field of technology, as defined by Zucker and Darby (1999; 2001), are rare so that they might not show up frequently 
in firms involved in M&As.  
4 We choose fixed-effects Poisson regression over fixed-effects negative binomial (Hausman et al., 1984) because the latter is not a true FE 
method (see Allison and Waterman, 2002 for a discussion). Since in our paper endogeneity is a concern due to unobserved variables such as 
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Table 1. FE Poisson regression for firms’ patenting output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Table displays coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
The first column shows the basic specification including firms’ size and the share of inventors 
and departing inventors as well as time dummies. In addition, a post-M&A dummy is included to 
test whether the patent outcome declines after the M&A. The estimated coefficients show the 
expected signs. We find that patent outcome is positively associated with firm size and the share 
of incumbent inventors. The marginal effects suggest that an increase of one in the firm size and 
inventor share variable leads to an increase of 13 percent (=exp(0.12)-1) and 46 percent 
(=exp(0.23)-1) of the number of patents, respectively. The marginal effect of inventors leaving 
the firm corresponds to a 19 percent decline of firm’s patent output. If 18 percent of the inventors 
leave in the M&A period as is the case for our sample (see Table A1) the patent productivity 
decreases by 3.4 percent (=19% *18%). Furthermore, we find that firms’ inventive output 
                                                 
managerial skills, we consider it crucial to control for unobserved fixed effect in order to mitigate these endogeneity concerns, thus our choice of 
FE Poisson. Moreover, FE Poisson models provide the correct point estimates if only the conditional mean is correctly specified, while, negative 
binomial models require the correct specification of the likelihood, which is a much stronger assumption. For the FE Poisson model, this implies 
that even if the second moment (i.e. the variance), is not correctly specified, the point estimates and, thus the magnitude of the effect, would still 
be correct. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size 0.12*** (0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
Incumbent inventors 0.23** (0.10) 
0.33*** 
(0.10) 
0.46*** 
(0.10) 
0.40*** 
(0.10) 
0.69*** 
(0.10) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
Departing inventors -0.17*** (0.03) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.18*** 
(0.03) 
-0.20*** 
(0.03) 
-0.18*** 
(0.03) 
-0.20*** 
(0.03) 
After M&A -0.13*** (0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
Departing*After M&A  -0.33*** (0.06) 
      
Incumbent*After M&A  -1.92*** (0.13) 
-1.89*** 
(0.13) 
-1.92*** 
(0.13) 
-1.90*** 
(0.13) 
-2.04*** 
(0.14) 
New key inventors    -0.24*** (0.04) 
-0.60*** 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.38*** 
(0.08) 
New key*After M&A      0.70*** (0.07)  
0.49*** 
(0.09) 
Incumbent *New key        -3.68*** (0.58) 
-2.81*** 
(0.76) 
Incumbent *New key* 
After M&A  
        2.43** 
(1.15) 
Observations 6105 6105 6105 6105 6105 6105 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Likelihood Ratio Test 2148.89 2042.39 2180.33 2158.14 2173.95 2160.53 
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decreases in the post-M&A years; after the M&A event, the productivity is 14 percent lower, 
which corresponds to 2.5 patents at the sample mean.  
The second specification includes the variables capturing sources of invention declines at the firm 
level after the M&A event, namely inventor departure and productivity declines of the inventors 
that stay. First, we find a significant and negative effect of the interaction term between the 
inventor share and the post-M&A dummy, indicating that patent productivity of inventors 
declines after the M&A.  Second, we find a negative and significant association for inventors 
leaving the firm after the M&A. We also find that the productivity decline of the inventors that 
remain in the acquiring firm is larger than the patents lost due to inventor departure. A t-test for 
the equality of both coefficients shows that the difference is significantly different from zero 
(Chi2=139.07; p-value=0.000). 
The third and fourth specifications include the share of new key inventors before and after the 
M&A. The results show that while hiring a key inventor in the immediate pre-M&A years is 
counterproductive we find that newly hired key inventors are significantly and positively 
associated with the post-M&A patent outcome. The direct positive impact of newly hired key 
inventors on firms’ post-M&A patenting output corresponds to an increase of 0.96 percentage 
points (=exp(-0.05+0.7)-exp(-0.05))5. This finding is in line with hypothesis 1.  
The last two specifications present the test of hypothesis 2. In support of the hypothesis, we find 
that there is a positive and significant indirect association between newly hired key inventors on 
the patenting output of incumbent inventors. The impact of newly hired key inventors on firms’ 
patenting output through the positive effects on incumbent inventors accounts for 1.34 percentage 
points (=exp(-2.04+2.43)-exp(-2.04)). Moreover, the positive effect of the newly hired key 
inventors, represented by the triple interaction term (INVENTORS*NEW KEY *after M&A), 
outweighs the negative effect of the M&A on the inventors’ productivity (INVENTORS*after 
M&A) as the test on the equality of the coefficients suggests (Chi2=13.32; p-value=0.000). The 
comparison of before/after and direct/indirect effects are displayed in Figure 1. Appendix II 
presents further analysis based on the technological intensity of firms’ industries and some 
robustness checks.  
                                                 
5 See Shang et al. (2015) for a discussion of the interpretation of interaction effects in Poisson models. 
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Figure 1. Effect of newly hired key inventors on patent output 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Although M&As are acknowledged as an important means to access innovative assets and know-
how, inventive output often declines in the post-M&A period (Comanor and Scherer, 2013; Hitt 
et al., 1990, 1996; Ornaghi, 2009; Valentini, 2012; Veugelers, 2006). We argue and show that a 
measure that firms can take to enhance incumbent inventors’ output after an M&A is the hiring of 
key inventors (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Ganco, 2013; Groysberg and Lee, 2009; Rosenkopf 
and Almeida, 2003; Singh and Agrawal, 2011). The hiring of new key inventors in the post-
M&A period is associated with lower levels of post-M&A inventive output declines. The hiring 
of key inventors affects inventive output in two ways. On the one hand, there is a direct effect in 
the sense that these newly hired key inventors increase inventive output after an M&A by 
increasing the knowledge base of the acquiring firm and, hence, accelerating the firm’s invention 
output. The newly hired key inventors provide the acquiring firm with new skills, competencies, 
and experiences (Rao and Drazin, 2002), gathered at their former employer (Barney, 1991; 
Groysberg et al., 2008). On the other hand, newly hired key inventors improve the productivity of 
the inventors already working for the acquiring firm. This implies that newly hired key inventors 
do not only add to a firms’ existing knowledge base (Rao and Drazin, 2002) but that they also 
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improve the exploitation of the existing knowledge base (Hackman, 2002). Hiring new key 
inventors sends a positive signal to incumbent inventors, reassuring that invention is of 
importance to the firm, even in times of corporate restructuring. As inventors have a strong 
preference to work with higher qualified colleagues (Barabasi et al., 2002; Wagner and 
Leydesdorff, 2005), newly hired key inventors can also increase the motivation and productivity 
of incumbent inventors (Allison and Long, 1990). In addition, newly hired key inventors can 
leverage their central position in the firm and their resource access to facilitate the invention 
process within the firm. Overall, this suggests that an appropriate hiring policy for external key 
inventors can counteract invention declines in the aftermath of an M&A.  
Managerial Implications 
While descriptive, our results suggest firms do not need to be passive observers of the 
consequences of M&As, but rather can take specific steps to minimize the negative effects of 
M&As on innovation performance. Our findings indicate managers should be proactive in setting 
a post-M&A human resource strategy and should focus their attention rather on the inventors that 
stay with the firm than on the inventors that are departing (Hussinger, 2012). This can be seen as 
good news for managers because it is relatively easier to foster and support the innovation 
activities of inventors that stay than to design attractive contracts for those inventors that are 
planning to leave the firm. In particular, our results further suggest that during the turbulent times 
that M&As represent managers should aim at recruiting top-performing inventors that have the 
potential to bring superior knowledge and research capabilities, and to provide new leadership in 
the new M&A organization.  
Our results seem to be supported by previous studies and anecdotal evidence. Dixon and Nelson 
(2005) report that human resource professionals are often not involved in the M&A planning and 
execution team which is typically almost entirely comprised of people from finance, IT, and other 
disciplines seen as essential to making the deal work. As shown by the acquisition of Gillette by 
P&G, an integration team that monitors and manages the M&A process can prevent declining 
benefits from an M&A. To avoid brain drain and to ensure continued pre-M&A levels of 
invention, P&G conducted a successful key-inventors’ hiring policy. Following this strategy, 
P&G-Gillette is regarded as one of the most successful M&As in the recent past (Kanter, 2009). 
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Limitations and further research 
As any, our study is not free of limitations. First, the analysis presented in this paper has to be 
considered as descriptive. The results have to be interpreted as associations rather than as causal 
effects. The reason is that the effects that we analyze occur in an endogenous system of strategic 
choices. Firms selectively decide to engage in M&As and they do so for various reasons. Around 
the M&A event, major organizational and strategic analydecisions are taken, sometimes while 
managerial attention being absorbed by the M&A event itself. We addressed the endogeneity 
concerns of leaving and newly hired inventors to some extent by using lagged variables as 
regressors. A further limitation that our study shares with the majority of inventor mobility 
studies (Ge et al., 2016; Hoisl, 2007; Li et al., 2014; Trajtenberg et al., 2006) is that we can only 
define mobility based on patent documents. So, we miss the mobility of inventors that change 
their job without patent documentation. Furthermore, we cannot distinguish inventors who 
change their job from those that retire.  
Following recent studies (Kaiser et al., 2018; Cassiman et al., 2018), future research could 
expand the research presented in this paper by including the impact of incoming inventors from 
universities, and compare it with that of inventors coming from other firms. Another topic of 
relevance for inventor mobility is non-compete agreements6 (e.g. Marx et al., 2009; Arts and 
Fleming, 2018). An interesting venue for research would be to further investigate these two areas. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Our study contributes to the literature that illustrates the importance of the transferability of 
knowledge across and within firms through individual talents (Kim, 1997; Song et al., 2003; 
Zander and Kogut, 1995) and to the literature on the role of key inventors for knowledge 
exploitation. We add to the prior literature by showing that key inventors play an essential role in 
knowledge transfer also for firms in periods of reorganization and that, as such, they can mitigate 
negative inventive output effects in post-M&A periods. 
Interestingly, our understanding of the crucial role of newly hired key inventors, who are both 
directly and indirectly associated with the post-M&A inventive output of firms, echoes the 
                                                 
6 Our results hold if the subsample of countries with non-compete agreements serves as the base for the analysis. 
These estimations are available upon request.  
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classical statement by Joseph Schumpeter who mentioned that “… inventions are always 
associated with the rise to leadership of New Men …” (and women, we would like to add) 
(Schumpeter, 1982(1939), p. 96). These newly hired key inventors act as Schumpeterian agents 
of change who not only alter existing routines and introduce and generate new knowledge that 
impacts the inventive output of the firms, through their key position within the firm, but they can 
also use their leadership position to disseminate knowledge to others, to motivate colleagues, and 
to create an innovative environment within the firm. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs.  
Patents per year 17.58 87.13 0 1612 6105 
Size 6.78 2.13 0 14.45 6105 
Incumbent inventors 0.04 0.09 0 0.69 6105 
Departing inventors 0.18 0.23 0 1 6105 
New key inventors 0.06 0.18 0 1 6105 
 
Table A2. Bivariate correlations 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Patents per year 1     
Size 0.25* 1    
Incumbent inventors 0.06* -0.29* 1   
Departing inventors 0.09* 0.09* 0.20* 1  
After M&A 0.00 0.22* -0.15* 0.08* 1 
New key inventors -0.01 -0.04* 0.16* 0.18* -0.07* 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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APPENDIX II 
Further analysis and robustness checks 
As a further analysis, we re-estimated the different specifications distinguishing industries 
according to the level of technology intensity. We followed the OECD (2011) classification and 
distinguish between low-tech and high-tech industries. In contrast to the main results and the 
results for the high tech sector, we do not find evidence for a direct effect of new key inventors 
for post-M&A inventive output in low tech sectors. This finding which is in line with Groysberg 
et al. (2008), who analyze security analysts, might be explained by the lack of infrastructure, 
complementary work practices (Ichniowski et al., 1997; Peteraf, 1993) and qualified co-workers 
(Groysberg et al., 2008; Hackman, 2002) for incoming key inventors that would allow them to 
exploit their knowledge immediately after arrival. 
Table A3. High-Tech Sectors: FE Poisson regression for firms’ patenting output 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size 0.19*** 
(0.01) 
0.21*** 
(0.01) 
0.18*** 
(0.01) 
0.17*** 
(0.01) 
0.17*** 
(0.01) 
0.16*** 
(0.01) 
Incumbent inventors 0.32** 
(0.13) 
0.63*** 
(0.14) 
0.38*** 
(0.13) 
0.33** 
(0.13) 
1.11*** 
(0.14) 
0.95*** 
(0.15) 
Departing inventors -0.11** 
(0.04) 
-0.68*** 
(0.10) 
-0.12*** 
(0.05) 
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.12*** 
(0.05) 
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
After M&A -0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.17*** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
Departing*After M&A  0.69*** (0.10) 
    
Incumbent*After M&A  -0.55*** (0.15) 
-0.62*** 
(0.15) 
-0.54*** 
(0.15) 
-0.64*** 
(0.15) 
-0.76*** 
(0.17) 
New key inventors   0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.88*** 
(0.06) 
0.38*** 
(0.06) 
-0.27** 
(0.12) 
New key*After M&A    1.28*** (0.11) 
 0.79*** 
(0.13) 
Incumbent *New key     -12.8*** 
(1.19) 
-11.8*** 
(1.60) 
Incumbent *New key* 
After M&A  
    5.76*** 
(2.11) 
Observations 2670 2670 2670 2670 2670 2670 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Likelihood Ratio Test 1735.02 1722.28 1728.30 1712.87 1733.08 1719.78 
Note: Table displays coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A4. Low-Tech Sectors: FE Poisson regression for firms’ patenting output 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size 0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Incumbent inventors 0.46*** 
(0.16) 
0.68*** 
(0.16) 
1.08*** 
(0.15) 
1.11*** 
(0.15) 
0.75*** 
(0.17) 
0.98*** 
(0.17) 
Departing inventors -0.19*** 
(0.04) 
1.00*** 
(0.08) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
-0.25*** 
(0.04) 
-0.26*** 
(0.04) 
After M&A 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.84*** 
(0.04) 
0.33*** 
(0.03) 
0.38*** 
(0.03) 
0.34*** 
(0.03) 
0.44*** 
(0.03) 
Departing*After M&A  -1.47*** (0.08) 
    
Incumbent*After M&A  -5.66*** (0.24) 
-5.01*** 
(0.24) 
-4.88*** 
(0.24) 
-5.00*** 
(0.24) 
-6.13*** 
(0.27) 
New key inventors   -0.36*** 
(0.06) 
-0.14* 
(0.07) 
-0.66*** 
(0.08) 
-0.20* 
(0.11) 
New key*After M&A    -0.69*** (0.13) 
 -1.53*** 
(0.17) 
Incumbent *New key     3.49*** 
(0.59) 
0.27 
(0.78) 
Incumbent *New key* 
After M&A  
    16.00*** 
(1.64) 
Observations 3435 3435 3435 3435 3435 3435 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Likelihood Ratio Test 2611.77 2605.98 2741.17 2755.99 2753.91 2793.95 
Note: Table displays coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Further, to show that the output premium is coming from newly hired key inventors vs. regular 
inventors, we present the different models including non-key inventors7 (Table A5). The results 
show that the hiring of new non-key inventors brings a positive and significant direct effect into 
the acquiring firm, however, non-key inventors fail to increase acquiring firms’ invention through 
a positive effect in their peers (the indirect effect is not significant).  
  
                                                 
7 Non-key inventors are defined as those inventors that are new to the firm and that do not qualify as key inventors since their number of citations 
is not above the 75% if the incumbent inventors at the acquiring firm. Similar to key inventors, non-key inventors is conceptualized as the ratio of 
non-key inventors hired at time t over the total number of inventors at time t.  
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Table A5. FE Poisson regression for firms’ patenting output 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Size 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Incumbent inventors 0.45*** 0.49*** 0.28** 0.29** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) 
Departing inventors -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
After M&A -0.01 -0.04** -0.01 -0.04** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Incumbent*After M&A -1.87*** -1.91*** -1.91*** -2.05*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) 
New non-key inventors -0.02*** -0.07*** -0.02*** -0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
New non-key *After M&A  0.07***  0.07*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Incumbent * New non-key   0.25*** 0.30** 
  (0.08) (0.12) 
Incumbent * New non-key*After 
M&A 
   0.10 
   (0.15) 
Observations 6,105 6,105 6,105 6,105 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Likelihood Ratio Test  2780 2818 2791 2840 
Note: Table displays coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Moreover, the hiring of these new non-key inventors, contrary to the hiring of new key inventors, 
do not outweigh the post-inventive output decline of incumbent inventors (Chi2=147.03; p-
value=0.00), which confirms the existence of output premium derived from hiring key inventors. 
Finally, to address the possible concerns regarding the underestimation of standard errors by the 
fixed-effects Poisson estimator, we re-estimate the different specifications using zero-inflated 
Poisson (ZIP) models, which account for the overdispersion coming from the excess of zeros in 
the data8 (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2013; Lambert, 1992; Long, 1997). The ZIP model allows 
overdispersion through the splitting process that models the outcomes as zero or nonzero, and 
similar to the hurdle models, supplement the count density with a binary process (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2013). As shown in Table A6, the results, and most importantly the significance of the 
coefficients of interest do not significantly change with respect to the main FE Poisson 
regression. 
                                                 
8 In our sample, 3,476 (out of 6,105) firm-year observations have zero patent applications (approximately 57%). 
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Table A6. Zero-Inflated Poisson regression for firms’ patenting output 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Incumbent inventors 0.94*** 1.02*** 1.10*** 1.03*** 1.34*** 1.12*** 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Departing inventors -0.08*** -0.03 -0.07** -0.10*** -0.07** -0.10*** 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
After M&A -0.26*** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.21*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Departing *After M&A  -0.08     
 (0.06)     
Incumbent *After M&A  -1.16*** -1.21*** -1.24*** -1.23*** -1.41*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) 
New key inventors   -0.46*** -0.97*** -0.28*** -0.81*** 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) 
New key *After M&A    0.89***  0.70*** 
   (0.07)  (0.10) 
Incumbent *New key     -3.61*** -1.81** 
    (0.59) (0.74) 
Incumbent *New key 
*After M&A 
     3.32*** 
     (1.27) 
      
Observations 6,105 6,105 6,105 6,105 6,105 6,105/ 
Deal Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Model chi-square 304192 304273 304413 304557 304456 304566 
Note: Table displays coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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